

# Eurocomed DRG Technical Forum 2006 FRANKFURT November 20-21, 2006

## France – Access to Innovation: Stakeholder Reality


*Pr Robert LAUNOIS*

**28, rue d'Assas**

**75006 Paris – France**

Tel . 01 44 39 16 90 – Fax 01 44 39 16 92

E-mail : [reesfrance@wanadoo.fr](mailto:reesfrance@wanadoo.fr) - Web : [www.rees-france.com](http://www.rees-france.com)



# Historical Background

- Until 2004 the fundings of « public hospitals » depended exclusively on global budgets which were mainly fixed on a historical basis. The private for profit sector had its own reimbursement system until 2005.
- The PPS was introduced in the public sector in 2004 covering 10 % of acute public hospital care. Currently, about 35 % of its activity is covered. Private for profit hospital, have been funded entirely by the PPS since 1 st march 2005.



# *The New Hospital Reimbursement Schemes*

# T2A – 3 modes of Hospital Reimbursement

## Activity based reimbursement

Tariffs per hospital stay : DRG Tariffs and daily supplements added to DRG

Tariffs per medical procedures: outpatient care activities: imaging, lab tests(CCAM), Sessions, Consultations

Real cost payments: Onerous drugs and medical devices

## Not Activity based reimbursement (block grant)

Public utility missions and contractual activities (MIGAC)

## Mix Funding

Annual Lump sum funding: Emergency treatment, organ retrieval and transplants

# T2A – Prospective Payment Systeme

## DRG + Day-outliers

When the length of stay (LOS) falls outside the limit set per DRG by the Technical Agency for Hospital Information (ATIH) then, a financial adjustment is made :

### ■ If the LOS > upper bound of the DRG:

→ activity above the high outlier point is only reimbursed in addition to the DRG at 0,75 of the DRG daily average tariff

Hospitalisation cost = DRG + 0,75 x n days x (DRG/ALOS)

### ■ If the LOS < lower bound of the DRG:

→ activity below the low outlier point is only reimbursed on the top of the DRG at 0,50 of the DRG daily average tariff

# T2A - Prospective Payment System DRG + Daily Supplements [2006]

**PTCA and AMI  
with co  
morbidity :**

**DRG 1682**

**4 533,22 €**

**+**

**Transfert  
into  
intensive  
care unit**

**10 Days in  
ICU under  
mechanical  
ventilation**

**824,91 €**

**X 10**

**Hospitalisation  
Cost**

**12 774,22 €**

# T2A - Prospective Payment System

DRG + DAILY SUPPLEMENTS + EXPENSIVE MEDICAL DEVICES [2006]

PTCA and AMI  
with co  
morbidity :

**DRG 1682**

**4 533,22 €**

**+**

Transfert  
into  
reanimation

**10 Days in  
ICU with  
mechanical  
ventilation**

**824,91 €**

**X 10**

**Hospitalisation  
Cost**

**12 774,22 €**

**Overall  
Cost**


Medical device

**Drug Eluting  
Stent**

**DES : 1632 €**

**14 407,18 €**


# T2A – Internal Audit



# Hospital Stakeholder : Financial Manager , Pharmacist, Medical Information Chief



The orchestra chief is the head of the financial department . He can't do anything without its two faithful lieutenants: the hospital pharmacist and the Medical Information manager (DIM).



**Pharmacist**

The pharmacist manages the medical devices purchasing policy : he negotiates prices and discounts, he references the products, signs contract with the ARH for the proper use of expensive drugs and medical devices...



**DIM**

The DIM Manages the interactions between purchasers and payers. He is at the origin of the income flows for the hospital and figures out the costs of the treatments. He has essential links with the medical team...



*Get More Bang  
For The Buck*

# The Economic Question


**Where should we put our money  
to lighten the burden of illness?**

Conventional treatment or innovative treatment?

# The Answer


Choose the treatment which has the highest rate of return on the therapeutic, human and financial aspects per invested monetary unit.

# HTA: The Bridge Between Science and Decision




# What Amount of Money Has to Be Invested to Get The Expected Benefits?

**The ratio additional Investment / induced health outcomes :**




# How Much are the Fit Willing to Pay?




# A Need: To Take Hold of the Uncertainty Which Presides Over the Rules of the Game

- The value (K) allocated by the Society to an amount of additional effect is a **socio-political value** which the evaluator cannot judge.
- The results must be analysed in light of the results of the different **possible willingness to pay** from the purchaser by constructing an acceptability curve for the treatment by the statutory authorities.
- This curve shows the probability that this treatment will considered to be **efficient** by the authorities for all possible values of K.
- **Estimation procedure**: generation of  $\Delta E$ ,  $\Delta C$  couples by bootstrap – Selection of the points beneath the line for all values of K.

# Proportion of Cost / Effective Samples for The Willingness to Pay $K_0, K_1, K_2$



# Probability of Making the Right Choice when Xigris is Preferred to Conventional Treatments [STIC 2002-2005]



# *Statistical Analysis*

# Observational Studies : Pros & Cons


## ■ Randomised Trials (RCTs)

- “Gold standard”
- Populations comparable (except for the treatment given)
- Simple analyses
- Good internal validity → relevant for adoption decisions

## ■ Observational Studies (OSs)

- Sometimes, randomisation infeasible, unethical or too costly
- Pre-existent non-randomised data available (e.g. registries)
- Real life practice ≠ Strict protocol-driven conditions
- Good external validity → relevant for policy decisions

# Recruitment Bias



Selection bias : patients selected according to some characteristics correlated with outcome

# Identification of Recruitment Bias

- Question: Are the baseline characteristics balanced between the two phases ?

- Standardised difference d: 
$$\frac{(\bar{x}_{After} - \bar{x}_{Before})}{\sqrt{\frac{S_{After}^2 + S_{Before}^2}{2}}} * 100$$

- $d > 10\%$  => Indicate serious unbalance


# Reduction of Recruitment Bias

## The Use of PS Matching

- **Propensity Score (PS)**: Probability that a person of given characteristics is exposed to the treatment
- Total comparability between the two phases if  $PS_{\text{After}} = PS_{\text{Before}}$
- **Simulation of a RCT with PS matching**:
  - Match a treated subject to the unexposed subject with the nearest PS
  - Comparability of patients is guaranteed on the observed covariates

# Deviation of Treatment Costs from Normality

## The Non Parametric Bootstrap Method



# Conclusion

*The implementation of databases fed by professionals based on individual data, changes deeply the assessment methods.*

- New endpoints are introduced
  - Uncertainty
  - QoL assessment
  - Estimates of the additional investments required to obtain the expected or actual clinical benefits
  
- A new ethic of our duties arises:

*« prodigate the best » per euro invested*